This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the causal e¤ect of …rm investment on exporting behavior. The identi…cation hinges on regional variations in the 2004 value-added tax pilot reform in China, which generated positive investment shocks. The instrumental variable estimation results show that …rm investment signi…cantly and substantially increases the likelihood of exporting, and this e¤ect is largely due to the positive e¤ect of …rm investment on …rm productivity.
Introduction
"The key unanswered question is how …rms obtain the characteristics that allow them to easily enter the export market." Bernard and Jensen (2004) A robust …nding from recent …rm-level analyses is that exporters are more productive than non-exporters (for a review of empirical evidence, see Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2012) . The leading explanation is that …rms with better characteristics (such as productivity) self-select into export markets (for a review of …rm heterogeneity theories, see Redding, 2011 ). However, a question that continues to intrigue researchers is how …rms obtain superior characteristics to facilitate their entrance into the export market, as exempli…ed in the above quotation.
Recent literature has emphasized the importance of …rm investment in technology upgrading for successful exporting (see, for example, Damijan, Kostevc, and Polanec, 2008; Cassiman, Golovko, and Martinez-Roz, 2010; Iacovone and Javorcik, 2012). However, there is an inherent empirical challenge to establish the causality from …rm investment to exporting; that is, investment and exporting decisions are jointly determined. For example, Atkeson and Burstein (2010), Lileeva and Tre ‡er (2010), Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2011), and Bustos (2011) all model the simultaneous selection of investment in technology upgrading and exporting. Meanwhile, another complication in the identi…cation is that there could be reverse causality from exporting to investment. For example, Criscuolo, Haskel and Slaughter (2010) …nd that among several thousand U.K. enterprises across all industries in 1994-2000, those engaging globally spend more resources on innovation.
This paper contributes to the literature by using a quasi-natural experiment to identify the causal e¤ect of …rm investment on …rm exporting. In 2004, China started to reform its value-added tax (VAT) system in six broadly de…ned industries in the three northeastern provinces. 1 Under the new taxation system, the purchase of …xed assets can be deducted from the tax base, which substantially lowers the cost of …xed assets (e.g., by 13 to 17 percent) and hence generates substantial tax incentives for …rms to invest. Previous studies (e.g., Chen, He, and Zhang, 2011) have shown that the VAT reform indeed increased …rm investment. Our empirical analysis uses regional variations generated by the 2004 VAT reform, that is, the reform was …rst piloted in only 3 of 31 provinces, as an instrument for …rm investment. Meanwhile, to further improve our identi…cation, we adopt a plausibly exogenous instruments framework developed by Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012) , which relaxes the strict exogeneity condition of the instrumental variable. We …nd that …rm investment has a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the probability of exporting. Speci…cally, the average exporting propensity of northeastern …rms increases by 2:39 percent due to the increase in …xed investment after the reform, which is large relative to the average exporting propensity of 32:94 percent for the whole sample. These …nd-ings are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks, including using a di¤erent standard errors estimation, checking a multi-industry issue, using a surviving …rms sample, using an alternative measurement of investment incentives, and using di¤erent subsamples.
To shed light on the underlying mechanisms through which …rm investment increases the probability of exporting, we …rst show that …rm investment signi…cantly improves …rm productivity, which in turn signi…cantly increases the probability of exporting. We also …nd that the e¤ect of …rm investment on the probability of exporting is larger in industries facing larger …nancial constraints, implying that …rms are bounded on the supply side of credit and the VAT pilot reform largely increased …rm investment by reducing credit constraints. We further …nd that the e¤ect of …rm investment is larger in more competitive industries, suggesting that …rms in less competitive industries may partially pass the e¤ect of the VAT pilot reform to their consumers, resulting in a smaller e¤ect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the estimation framework, including a description of the institutional background of the VAT reform in China, a brief discussion of the conceptual framework, data and variables, and the identi…cation strategy. Empirical …ndings, including main results, robustness checks and mechanisms, are presented in Section 3. The paper concludes with Section 4.
Empirical Strategy

Value-Added Tax Reform in China
The VAT is a widely-used type of tax. For example, more than 130 countries (including both developed and developing countries) have adopted VAT and raised about 20 percent or more of their tax revenues from it. The advantage of the VAT lies in its simplicity and e¢ ciency due to the low administration cost and less economic distortion. 2 A commonly used type of VAT is the consumption type, that is, the tax is levied based on the di¤erence between …rms'total sales of their products and their purchases of all inputs (including …xed assets). China introduced the VAT nationwide in its 1994 fundamental tax reform. The standard tax rate was 17 percent, while for some goods, such as agricultural products, the tax rate was 13 percent. Since its introduction, the VAT has become the major source of tax revenue for the Chinese government. For example, VAT revenue in 2007 accounted for about 31 percent of total tax revenue. 3 However, before the reform in 2004, China's VAT was di¤erent from the standard consumption type VAT in other countries, as …rms' investment in …xed assets was not deductible from the tax base. Therefore, …xed assets were taxed twice: once directly when …rms purchased the assets and once indirectly when consumers bought goods produced with these assets. Such double taxation raised the cost of …xed assets and discouraged …rms'investment in …xed assets. The adoption of the so-called production type VAT was an outcome of China's economic conditions at the time when the VAT was introduced. In 1994, China's economy was experiencing overheating and the central government faced stringent budget constraints. As a result, the production type VAT was conceived as a way for the central government to raise tax revenue and restrain investment in …xed assets.
A decade after the 1994 reform, the overall economic environment in China had changed signi…cantly. On the one hand, through a series of …scal centralization policies, the …scal position of the central government improved substantially: from 1995 to 2004, budgetary revenue increased from 10.8 percent to around 20 percent of GDP. On the other hand, the macroeconomic austerity policy since mid-1993 e¤ectively controlled the crisis of overheating and hyper-in ‡ation. The new question faced by the Chinese reformists was how to deepen the economic reform, such as by providing a level playing …eld and improving the competitiveness of …rms.
As a way to stimulate investment and promote an equitable market environment, the central government started to consider reforming its VAT system. On September 12, 2004 , the Chinese Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation o¢ cially announced that China would reform its VAT system in six broadly de…ned industries (i.e., equipment manufacturing, petroleum and chemical manufacturing, metallurgy, ship building, automobile manufacturing, and agricultural product processing industries) in three northeastern (NE) provinces (i.e., Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang). 4 The new VAT regime was applicable to transactions from July 1, 2004 onward. The crux of this VAT reform was to change the previous production type VAT to the standard consumption type VAT. Under the new VAT system, the purchase of …xed assets could be deducted from the tax base, which would substantially lower the cost of …xed assets (e.g., by 13 to 17 percent). Three years later, the reform was expanded to include another 26 cities in six central provinces and mining and electricity industries. Finally, the new VAT policy became applicable to all provinces and all industries in January 2009. Table 1 lists eligible as well as ineligible manufacturing industries in the VAT pilot reform in 2004. The majority of manufacturing industries are eligible and the inclusiveness in classi…cation makes it particularly di¢ cult for …rms to switch industries to take advantage of the tax incentive, ensuring that the same …rm was either eligible or ineligible before and after the pilot reform. Meanwhile, as shown by Chen, He and Zhang (2011), the distribution of eligible and ineligible …rms is balanced between NE and non-NE cities and before and after the pilot reform, which makes concerns about the industry selection problem less severe.
Conceptual Framework
To illustrate how the VAT reform a¤ects exporting behavior (through investment in technology upgrading), we brie ‡y discuss a conceptual framework that extends the heterogeneous …rm framework developed by Melitz (2003) to a two-period one. Speci…cally, in the …rst period, upon paying a …xed cost of entry, …rms draw their productivity levels, and then decide whether to exit the market immediately or start production. If …rms choose to produce, they need to pay a …xed cost of production, and at the same time have two additional options-export to the foreign market (with a …xed cost) and invest in technology upgrading (with a …xed cost). Investment in technology upgrading will increase …rm productivity to a given level (which is assumed to be higher than the cuto¤ productivity level of exporting). 5 In the second period, if a …rm invests in technology upgrading in the …rst period, it will have a new productivity level in the second period and the …rm reconsiders its production and exporting behavior based on the new productivity. For …rms who do not invest in technology upgrading, their production and exporting behavior in the second period will be the same as in the …rst period. The VAT reform in China changes the cost of investment in technology upgrading, as shown in the previous section, in northeastern cities where such investment was absent in …rms for years. To …t into this institutional context, we assume that (1) before the reform, the VAT is large enough to deter …rms from investing in technology upgrading; and (2) after the reform, the abolishment of the VAT on investment makes the investment in technology upgrading a¤ordable. Given mild assumptions about …xed costs of exporting and investment, it can be shown that among non-exporters, in the post-VAT reform period, less productive …rms invest in technology upgrading and start exporting; while more productive …rms maintain status quo. Among exporters, in the post-VAT reform period, all continue to export and do not invest in technology upgrading. As a result, on average the ratio of exporters in the population after the VAT reform increases.
These results are intuitive. When advanced technology is available for a reasonable …xed cost, …rms'investment behavior will be determined by the magnitude of their gains from technology upgrading. For high productivity …rms, the gains will be small and thus they will not invest. But for low productivity …rms, the gains will be large and they have higher incentives to invest. More generally, the lower is the initial productivity of the …rm, the larger will be the gains from investment and, therefore, the more likely the …rm will invest and export.
Data
The main data set used in this study comes from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF), conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China from 1998 to 2007. This is the most comprehensive …rm-level data set in China, as it covers all state-owned enterprises and all non-state-owned enterprises with annual sales above …ve million Renminbi (around US$650,000). The number of …rms varies from more than 140,000 in the late 1990s to more than 243,000 in 2007. The data set spans all 31 provinces or provinceequivalent municipalities, and all manufacturing industries, which ensures its invaluable national representativeness.
The data set provides detailed …rm information, including industry a¢ liation, location, and all operation and performance items from the accounting statements, such as exports, book value and net value of …xed assets, employment and wage rate. We depreciate all pecuniary variables with 2-digit price de ‡ators constructed by Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012). However, one drawback of this data set is that it does not directly provide information on …xed investment. To obtain data on …xed investment, we follow Song and Wu (2012) in using book values of …xed assets (reported in the ASIF data set) and assuming a constant depreciation rate of 5 percent. Speci…cally, investment by …rm f in year t, IN V f;t , is constructed with the equation
where = 0:05 is the constant depreciation rate; K f;t = (1 )K f;t 1 +(BK f;t BK f;t 1 ) =P rt is the capital stock for …rm f in year t; BK f;t is the book value of capital stock for …rm f in year t; and P rt is the provincial …xed investment price index in year t (from various years of the Chinese Statistical Yearbook compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China). For …rms established after 1998, the initial book value of capital stock (BK f;t ) is taken directly from the data set. For …rms founded before 1998, say 1985, we assume the same capital growth rate for the concerned …rm during 1985-1998 as that during 1998-2004 to predict the initial book value at the time of its establishment. Speci…cally,
where BK f;t 0 is the projected initial book value of capital stock for …rm f born in year t 0 ; BK f;t 1 is the book value of capital stock for …rm f that …rst appeared in the data set in year t 1 ; and g f is the geometric average capital stock growth rate of …rm f for the periods observed in the data set since year t 1 . Table 2a provides summary statistics and de…nitions of our key variables, respectively, for the whole sample and for two subsamples-NE cities (the location of the VAT pilot reform in 2004) and non-NE cities. The majority of …rms are non-exporters; only 32:9 percent of …rm-year observations belong to exporters, which is consistent with the general picture in the literature (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008) . Meanwhile, …rms in non-NE cities are more engaged in international trade than their counterparts in NE cities. That is, non-NE cities have higher percentages of exporters, higher export intensity, higher total export values, and larger coverage of export markets. One possible explanation for this pattern is that the opening of China in the late 1970s started in the southern, coastal regions, such as Guangdong and Fujian provinces. Table 2b further shows the comparison of exporter shares in NE and non-NE cities for each of the 24 eligible 2-digit industries. In the majority of industries, non-NE cities have higher exporting propensity than NE cities, but the latter have higher percentages of exporters in industries like Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals, Petroleum processing, and Agricultural and by-product. Firms located in NE cities tended to invest less than those in other places, re ‡ecting the motivation of the central government to select NE cities as pilot reform sites.
Identi…cation Framework
As elaborated in Meltiz (2003), the exporting decision hinges on whether the net export revenue is higher than the …xed cost of exporting. Speci…cally, the exporting decision by …rm f located in city c in industry i in year t is written as
where EXP f;i;c;t is the exporting status;R f;i;c;t is the expected net export revenue; and F represents the …xed cost for new exporters. Empirically, we proxyR f;i;c;t using the information available at the beginning of period t. Speci…cally, following Jensen (1999, 2004) , we use …rm size and wage rate, both measured in logarithm and at the end of period t 1. We include …rm investment incurred during period t 1, which in turn a¤ects …rm productivity andR f;i;c;t in period t. Further including industry and city time-invariant characteristics and common time e¤ects, we haveR f;i;c;t = IN V f;i;c;t 1 + X 0 f;i;c;t
where IN V f;i;c;t 1 is …rm investment, our regressor of interest; X f;i;c;t 1 is a vector of …rm characteristics including the logarithm of …rm size, and the logarithm of wage rate; i is the 2-digit industry …xed e¤ect, capturing all time-invariant industrial characteristics; 6 c is the city …xed e¤ect, capturing all time-invariant city characteristics including geographic features; and t is the time …xed e¤ect, capturing all shocks common to all …rms in the same year such as macroeconomic shocks.
Linearizing equation (2) and including EXP f;i;c;t 1 in X f;i;c;t 1 , we have the following estimation equation EXP f;i;c;t = IN V f;i;c;t 1 + X 0 f;i;c;t 1 + i + c + t + " f;i;c;t :
We use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors " f;i;c;t clustered at the city level to deal with potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems (see Bertrand, Du ‡o and Mullainathan, 2004). The crucial assumption for identifying the investment e¤ect on exporting is that conditional on all controls, …rm investment is uncorrelated with the error term. However, it is reasonable to doubt the satisfaction of this identifying assumption. For example, an aggressive CEO could be keen on investing and selling to foreign markets.
To improve the identi…cation, we explore time and regional variations in the reduction in the VAT generated by the VAT pilot reform, which has been shown to generate substantial incentives for …rms to invest (e.g., Chen, He, and Zhang, 2011). Speci…cally, we focus on the sample of eligible industries in the 2004 VAT pilot reform and use the policy reform to construct an instrument for …rm investment. The …rst stage of the instrumental variable estimation is IN V f;i;c;t = V AT c;t + X 0 f;i;c;t + i + c + t + f;i;c;t ;
where V AT c;t = N E c P ost2004 t captures the VAT pilot reform; N E c is an indicator of northeastern cities; and P ost2004 t is a post-reform indicator, taking a value of 0 for 1998-2003, 0.5 for 2004, and 1 for 2005-2007. v f;i;c;t is the heteroskedasticity-robust standard error clustered at the city level. The validity of the instrumental variable estimation hinges on two conditions, that is, the relevance condition (i.e., our instrumental variable is signi…cantly correlated with our regressor of interest and this correlation is strong) and the exclusion restriction (i.e., our instrumental variable does not a¤ect our outcome variable through channels other than the regressor of interest). While the relevance condition can be con…rmed by the signi…cance of in equation (4), the exclusion restriction requires further discussion.
There are two potential threats to the exclusion restriction of our instrument. The …rst one is that the pilot sites in the 2004 VAT pilot reform (i.e., three NE provinces) were not randomly selected, which implies that pilot sites and other places could be fun-damentally di¤erent and our instrument may a¤ect the probability of exporting directly through these fundamentals. To address this concern, we turn to the recent imperfect instrumental variable literature, which relaxes the exogeneity assumption of instrumental variables. Speci…cally, we adopt the plausibly exogenous instruments framework developed by Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012). Consider a generalization of our instrumental variable equation where captures all the e¤ects of our instrument V AT c;t 1 on our outcome variable EXP f;i;c;t through channels other than our regressor of interest IN V f;i;c;t 1 . Given , our instrument can identify the true value of in a modi…ed equation, i.e., EXP f;i;c;t = IN V f;i;c;t 1 + X 0 f;i;c;t 1 + i + c + t + " f;i;c;t ;
whereÊXP f;i;c;t EXP f;i;c;t V AT c;t 1 . A practical issue is how to estimate . Following the practice by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), we exploit the institutional details of the 2004 VAT pilot reform, that is, there existed several reform-ineligible industries in pilot and non-pilot sites. As the VAT pilot reform did not a¤ect these ineligible industries (and hence our instrument V AT c;t 1 does not a¤ect our regressor of interest IN V f;i;c;t 1 ), a regression of EXP f;i;c;t on V AT c;t 1 along with the same set of controls (i.e., X f;i;c;t 1 , i , c , t ) in the sample of reformineligible industries captures all the e¤ects of V AT c;t 1 on EXP f;i;c;t through channels other than IN V f;i;c;t 1 ; in other words, it provides an estimation of . With the estimated^ , we can then calculate the outcome variableÊXP f;i;c;t = EXP f;i;c;t ^ V AT c;t 1 in equation (5) and identify using V AT c;t 1 as the valid instrument.
The second potential bias is that if there were other reforms happening at the same time, our instrument may capture the e¤ects of these other reforms, which may in turn a¤ect our outcome variable through channels other than …rm investment. One example is the removal of the Multi…ber Arrangement (MFA) that came into e¤ect on January 1, 2005 and substantially increased Chinese exports in the textile and clothing industries (see Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei, 2013, for a recent study on this event). As NE cities (the location of the 2004 VAT pilot reform) hosted mostly heavy industries, our instrument may correlate with the MFA reform, which directly a¤ected the exporting behavior of …rms. To address this concern, we add, as a control, an interaction between an indicator of MFA-a¤ected industries (i.e., M F A i = 1 for Textiles industry and Garments industry; and 0 otherwise) and a post-2005 time indicator (i.e., P ost2005 t = 1 for 2005-2007 and 0 otherwise), i.e., M F A i P ost2005 t .
Empirical Results
Main Results
The instrumental variable estimation results are reported in Table 3 In column 1 of Table 3 , we use the raw data on exporting status and …nd a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of …rm investment on the likelihood of …rm exporting, a result consistent with the literature (e.g., Aw, Roberts and Xu, 2011; Bustos, 2011). 7 Meanwhile, the magnitude is found to be economically signi…cant. Given the fact that average …xed investment of NE …rms increases by 17:91 percent after the reform, our estimation result implies that the exporting propensity of northeastern …rms increases by 2:39 percent because of …xed investment, which is large relative to the average exporting propensity of 32:94 percent in the whole sample. That is, the probability of exporting is increased by the VAT pilot reform by 7:26 percent relative to the sample mean.
In column 2 of Table 3 , we address the potentially nonrandom selection of the VAT pilot reform sites and hence the endogeneity of our instrument by using the plausibly exogenous instruments framework proposed in equation (5) . We consistently …nd a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of …rm investment on exporting probability, and the magnitude almost does not change.
The plausibly exogenous instruments framework requires that our instrument a¤ects the likelihood of exporting in the VAT pilot reform eligible industries and the VAT pilot reform ineligible industries similarly in the absence of …rm investment (i.e., e = ine ).
In other words, our estimate in column 2 of Table 3 would be biased if there were cityindustry speci…c shocks, for example, shocks a¤ecting the VAT pilot reform sites and the VAT pilot reform eligible industries di¤erentially from other locations and other industries. We have addressed one possible city-industry speci…c shock, that is, the removal of the MFA on January 1, 2005, by including an additional control M F A i P ost2005 t in all our regressions. Another possible city-industry speci…c shock is that NE regions largely hosted heavy industries, which were mainly controlled by state-owned-enterprises (SOEs). 8 During 7 We also experiment with three alternative measures of exporting behavior, i.e., total export revenue, export intensity, and the number of export markets. As shown in columns 3-5 of Appendix Table 1 , we …nd that …rm investment (after being instrumented) signi…cantly increases its total export values, but not export intensity or the number of export markets. While new exporters increase their export intensity and the number of export markets, the overall insigni…cant e¤ects on export intensity and the number of export markets suggest the countervailing behavior of existing exporters and the dominance of the existing exporters in total exports. 8 It is also possible that after the VAT pilot reform, the government increased credit supply to eligible the sample period, China went through a series of privatization and restructuring of SOEs, which may have generated a city-industry speci…c shock. To control for this possible estimation bias, we construct two alternative measures-both at the …rm levelto capture the e¤ect of …rm ownership. Speci…cally, in column 3, we …rst include the share of a …rm's equity owned by the state sector (denoted by State Share), and …nd that the results are robust to this additional control. Second, in column 4, we classify …rms into di¤erent ownership types-speci…cally, SOEs, Chinese private …rms, …rms invested by multinationals from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (HMT), and …rm invested by multinationals from other foreign countries-based on their registration types reported in the data. We include three …rm-level ownership indicators-SOE, Foreign-Invested Firms, HMT-Invested Firms-as additional controls with the omitted default …rm ownership type being Chinese private …rms, and …nd robust results. The combination of these two exercises suggests that our …ndings are not driven by …rms with di¤erent ownership types. The identifying assumption of our plausibly exogenous instruments framework may also not hold if the government actively selected which industries to be eligible for the VAT pilot reform and which not. Speci…cally, our estimates would be systematically biased upward (downward) if the VAT pilot reform had a larger (smaller) direct e¤ect on exporting in eligible industries than ineligible industries. 9 As a further check, we conduct a placebo test, that is, we randomly generate a year of the VAT pilot reform between 2000 and 2006 (as we need to include two years of lag and at least one post-reform period), and randomly select 38 out of 414 cities to be the reform sites (as the 2004 VAT pilot reform took place in 38 cities). 10 Based on these random draws, we then construct a false VAT pilot reform variable ( ] V AT c;t ), and use ] V AT c;t as the regressor of interest in a reduced-form regression similar to equation (5), 11 i.e., EXP f;i;c;t = ] V AT c;t + X 0 f;i;c;t 1 + i + c + t + " f;i;c;t :
industries in treatment provinces, which may in turn a¤ect …rm exporting behavior. While the lack of credit supply data at the city-industry level prevents us from directly checking this possibility, we perform an indirect test. Speci…cally, we use a …rm's total debts to partially capture the degree of credit supply, and then control for it in the analysis. As shown in column 6 of Appendix Table 1 , our results about the e¤ect of …rm investment on exporting remain robust to this additional control, suggesting that the change in credit supply after the VAT pilot reform may not be the main driver of our …ndings. 9 Equation (5) where" f;i;c;t = e ine V AT c;t 1 + " f;i;c;t . Hence, when e > ine ,^ > ; and when e < ine , < . 10 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 11 It is not proper to perform an instrumental variable estimation using equation (5), as ] V AT c;t does not have explanatory power in the …rst stage.
We repeat this exercise 1,000 times. If equation (5) is correctly speci…ed, we shall …nd that most of these 1,000 coe¢ cients (^ ) have values close to zero and they are overall not systematically di¤erent from zero.
In Figure 1 , we plot the density distribution of the 1,000 estimates from the random draw of the VAT pilot reform year and sites. We …nd that the distribution of these estimates is centered around zero (i.e., the mean value is 0:000075), and our estimate using the true VAT pilot reform year and sites (i.e., 0:0225) is beyond the 95% quantile of these 1,000 placebo estimates (i.e., the 95% quantile is 0:0156). These results further boost our con…dence that our …ndings are not severely biased by misspeci…cation of the estimation equation.
In Appendix Table 2 , we further test di¤erential e¤ects of the VAT pilot reform on …rm investment and …rm exporting for initial non-exporters with di¤erent productivity levels (i.e., low and high) and initial exporters. Speci…cally, initial exporters are …rms that ever exported before the VAT pilot reform in 2004, and …rms that did not export before the VAT pilot reform are de…ned as initial non-exporters. We further divide initial nonexporters into two groups based on whether their pre-reform average productivity levels are above or below the median productivity level of the whole initial non-exporters group in each 4-digit industry. Initial non-exporters with low productivity levels (but not initial non-exporters with high productivity levels or initial exporters) increased their investment in response to the VAT pilot reform. Meanwhile, the VAT pilot reform increased the probability of exporting for all initial non-exporters but not for initial exporters. One possible explanation for these heterogeneous e¤ects across …rms is that what we have identi…ed here is the city average e¤ect of …rm investment on …rm exporting. This average e¤ect includes not only the direct e¤ect of …rm investment on its own exporting, but also indirect e¤ects through interactions of …rms in the same city. For example, the increase in …rm investment may improve infrastructure quality in the city, which generates positive spillovers to other …rms in the same locality and in turn a¤ects their exporting behavior. Also there may exist a general equilibrium e¤ect, e.g., new exporters may steal the market from existing exporters.
Robustness Checks
We provide some further robustness checks on the aforementioned estimation results in this subsection. To save space, we focus on the estimation speci…cation in column 3 of Table 3 , and only report the second-stage results of the instrumental variable estimations (the …rst-stage results are available on request).
Clustered Standard Errors at the Province Level. Although the 2004 VAT pilot reform was implemented at the province level, we calculate clustered standard errors at the city level in our previous regressions mainly for two reasons. First, Chinese provinces are large in geographic scale and there are substantial variations across cities within a province. Second, local city governments had much discretion in enforcing the reform in their localities, generating city variations in the implementation of the pilot reform. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, we calculate the standard errors clustered at the province level in column 1 of Table 4 . We continue to …nd a signi…cant e¤ect of …rm investment on the probability of exporting.
Single-vs. Multi-industry Firms Sample. Firms may produce goods and conduct investment in multiple industries, but our data only record one industry a¢ liation for each …rm. Without detailed information about …rm investment by industry, we may encounter estimation biases due to cross-industry spillovers or measurement errors, especially when …rms are active in both reform-eligible and reform-ineligible industries. To check whether and how our estimates are biased due to this multiple-industry issue, we obtain a product-level data set from the National Bureau of Statistics of China for 2000-2005, which contains information on each product (de…ned at the 5-digit product level) produced by the …rm. As the product-level data and the ASIF data use the same …rm identity, we can easily match the data, and then determine whether a …rm produces goods in single or multiple 3-digit industries.
With this information in hand, ideally, we can split …rms in our baseline sample into two groups-that is, …rms active only in eligible industries, and …rms active in both eligible and ineligible industries-and test whether the coe¢ cients are di¤erent in these two subsample regressions. 12 However, there are very few …rms (i.e., less than 1%) producing in both eligible and ineligible industries, which precludes the implementation of this robustness check. 13 Instead, we divide …rms into two groups, based on whether they are active in single or multiple 3-digit industries. Two subsample regression results are reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 , respectively. Consistent with our baseline …ndings, both estimates are signi…cantly positive. However, the estimated magnitude in the single-industry …rms sample (0:2098) is larger than the average e¤ect in the whole sample (0:1730), which is in turn larger than that in the multi-industry …rms sample (0:1270). One possible interpretation of these results is that there exist some negative cross-industry spillovers in investment. Another possible interpretation is that there are potential measurement errors with the status of the VAT-pilot-reform eligibility; in particular, it is di¢ cult for multi-industry …rms to identify what share of their production was a¤ected by the VAT pilot reform. Measurement errors in our regressor of interest may then bias the coe¢ cient of interest in the multi-industry …rms sample downward.
Surviving Firms Sample. With our regressor of interest measured at the city level, we are essentially estimating the city average e¤ect of investment on the probability of exporting, that is, whether …rms on average become more exporting-oriented in cities with the VAT pilot reform than in cities without the reform. However, the …rm composition of cities might change over time. For example, some …rms left our sample (exiters), some entered our sample (new entries), and some survived the reform (surviving …rms). If new entries and/or exiters had di¤erent degrees of investment and exporting across reform cities and other regions, our aforementioned estimation results may just capture the selection e¤ect, instead of the true e¤ect of investment on the probability of exporting. In studying the e¤ect of trade liberalization on …rm productivity, Pavcnik (2002) …rst incorporates such …rm exits in the estimation of the production function to more accurately calculate …rm productivity, and then …nds that exiters have lower productivity levels than surviving …rms.
To check whether our estimates are driven by entries and exits, we focus on a sample of surviving …rms (i.e., those existed both before and after the VAT pilot reform in 2004). Regression results are reported in column 4 of Table 4 . We continue to …nd a signi…cant e¤ect of investment, and the magnitude becomes even larger, implying that the selection from entries and exits does not drive our …ndings and only biases our estimate downward.
Capital-Labor Ratio. Given that our data do not record …rm investment information, the investment variable used in our analysis is calculated based on equation (1), with some underlying assumptions for the capital growth rate. As the VAT pilot reform reduced the marginal cost of capital relative to that of labor, …rms may respond optimally by shifting their production function toward capital, resulting in an increase in the capital-labor ratio. Given that the capital and labor information is well recorded in the data, we use the capital-labor ratio to provide additional evidence of an increase in investment after the VAT pilot reform and look at the e¤ect of investment on …rm exporting. In the unreported …rst-stage results of the instrumental variable estimation, we …nd that the VAT pilot reform in 2004 signi…cantly increased …rms'capital-labor ratio, i.e., the coe¢ cient is 0:1631 with a signi…cance level of 1%. As shown in column 5 of Table 4 , after being instrumented, the capital-labor ratio is found to have a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the probability of exporting, consistent with our …ndings using the measure of …rm investment.
SOEs vs. Non-SOEs. Cai and Harrison (2011) show that the VAT pilot reform has di¤erent investment e¤ects for SOEs and non-SOEs. To check whether our …ndings regarding the e¤ect of …rm investment on exporting di¤er across SOEs and non-SOEs, we conduct two separate regressions for these two groups. In the unreported …rst-stage results of the instrumental variable estimation, we …nd that the investment e¤ect of the VAT pilot reform is larger for SOEs (with an estimated coe¢ cient of 0:1873 and standard error of 0:0833) than that for non-SOEs (with an estimated coe¢ cient of 0:0848 and standard error of 0:0750), consistent with the …ndings in Cai and Harrison (2011) . Table 4 show that the e¤ect of …rm investment on the probability of exporting is positive and statistically signi…cant for non-SOEs, but insigni…cant and small in magnitude for SOEs. These results for SOEs and non-SOEs are puzzling-that is, the e¤ect of VAT pilot reform holds for non-SOEs but not for SOEs, despite the fact that the non-SOEs do not increase investment in response to the reform. However, we conduct this split-sample analysis mainly to compare our …ndings with Cai and Harrison (2011)'s, and …nd similar results. Meanwhile, we demonstrate in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 that our main …ndings regarding the e¤ect of …rm investment on exporting remain robust to the control of SOE versus non-SOE ownership.
Columns 6 and 7 of
Discussion
In the previous sections, we have identi…ed a signi…cant and positive e¤ect of …xed investment on the likelihood of exporting. In this subsection, we provide some further evidence to shed light on the underlying mechanisms through which …rm investment may a¤ect the likelihood of exporting.
Productivity Enhancement. One potential mechanism is that the VAT reform provides substantial tax incentives for …rms to upgrade their technologies, which subsequently improves their productivity levels and hence enhances the propensity to export (see, e.g., Atkeson and Burstein, 2010; Lileeva and Tre ‡er, 2010; Aw, Roberts, and Xu, 2011; and Bustos, 2011).
To test this productivity enhancement channel formally, we conduct two exercises. First, we regress …rm productivity on …rm investment using the VAT pilot reform as an instrument for the investment. For the measurement of …rm productivity, we focus on total factor productivity (TFP), estimated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 's method. 14 Regressions using the output-labor ratio and the value-added-labor ratio as alternative measures of …rm productivity produce similar results (available on request). The second stage results of the instrumental variable estimation are reported in column 1 of Table 5 . It is found that after being instrumented, …rm investment has a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on …rm productivity.
Second, we regress …rm exporting status on …rm productivity using the VAT pilot reform as an instrument for the productivity. We …nd in the …rst stage regression that the VAT pilot reform signi…cantly increased …rm productivity levels, i.e., an estimated coe¢ cient of 0:2282. In the second stage regression, as shown in column 2 of Table 5 , after being instrumented, …rm productivity casts a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the probability of exporting.
To lend further support to the argument of the productivity enhancement channel of the e¤ect of …rm investment on …rm exporting, we conduct the following back-ofthe-envelope calculation. 15 Speci…cally, if …rm investment a¤ects …rm exporting only through the productivity channel, then with the two estimated coe¢ cients in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 , we can calculate the e¤ect of …rm investment on …rm exporting as 1:6278 0:0941 = 0:1532. We then compare this number to the overall e¤ect of …rm investment on …rm exporting reported in column 3 of Table 3 (i.e., 0:1730). We …nd that the di¤erence is small in magnitude (i.e., 0:1730 0:1532 = 0:0198) and highly insigni…cant (i.e., the standard error clustered at the city-level has the value of 2:804). These results suggest that productivity enhancement is an important channel through which …rm investment a¤ects the probability of exporting.
To shed light on the di¤erent e¤ects across SOEs and non-SOEs reported in columns 6 and 7 of Table 4 , we investigate the productivity enhancement channel for SOEs and non-SOEs separately. As shown in columns 3 and 5 of Table 5 , …rm investment has a much larger and more signi…cant e¤ect on …rm productivity of non-SOEs than that of SOEs. Columns 4 and 6 further show that …rm productivity has a much larger and more signi…cant e¤ect on …rm exporting for non-SOEs than SOEs. These results suggest that while SOEs signi…cantly increased …rm investment after the VAT pilot reform, relative to non-SOEs, their productivity is less responsive to their investment and also their exporting behavior is less responsive to their productivity.
Financial Constraints. Firms making investment decisions consider both the demand and supply conditions, for example, the opportunity of investment and the supply of credit. The VAT pilot reform largely relaxed the constraints on the credit supply by increasing internal cash ‡ows, implying larger e¤ects for …rms with higher …nancial constraints. Hence, to establish the mechanism of the investment e¤ect on …rm exporting, we consider the situation where …rms face binding constraints on the supply side. Specifically, we exploit the variations in external …nancial dependence across sectors. Following Manova (2013) and Manova and Yu (2014), we construct the measure of external …nancial dependence as the share of aggregate capital expenditures not …nanced with internal cash ‡ows from operations at the 4-digit industry level using the pre-reform period data. 16 We then divide the sample into two subsamples, i.e., …rms in industries with external …nancial dependence above and below the median of industrial external …nance dependence. The second stage results of the instrumental variable estimations using these two subsamples are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 , respectively. It is found that industries with higher external …nancial dependence have a larger estimated coe¢ cient (i.e., 0:2417) than industries with lower external …nancial dependence do (i.e., 0:1133). 17 These results suggest that the VAT pilot reform has a larger e¤ect on industries with higher external …nancial dependence, and support the argument that …rms are bounded by the supply of credit for investment and the VAT pilot reform increased investment by reducing this binding constraint, which in turn led to an increase in the probability of exporting.
Pass-Through. The e¤ects of the VAT pilot reform on …rm behavior, including investment and exporting decisions, depend on the interactions between producers and consumers. If …rms have market power, they can pass more of the cost of VAT to their consumers, resulting in a small e¤ect of the VAT reform on their behavior. One would therefore expect that the e¤ects of the VAT pilot reform on …rm investment and exporting to be smaller in less competitive industries than in more competitive industries. To measure the degree of industry competition, we calculate the pre-reform Her…ndahl index (HHI) for each 4-digit industry; a higher value of HHI indicates a less competitive situation. 18 We then divide the sample into two subsamples, …rms in industries with HHI values above and below the median across industries. The second stage results of the instrumental variable estimations using these two subsamples are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 , respectively. We …nd that more competitive industries have a larger estimated coe¢ cient (i.e., 0:1844) than less competitive industries (i.e., 0:1391). 19 These results support the argument that the e¤ects of the VAT pilot reform on exporting are smaller in less competitive industries. Meanwhile, these …ndings are consistent with the evidence found by De Loecker, Glodberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2014) on the imperfect pass-through of cost savings from input tari¤ reduction to consumer prices.
Conclusion
The importance of …rms' …xed investment for successful exporting has attracted much attention in the recent literature. This paper contributes to this literature by identifying the causal e¤ect of …rm investment on its exporting behavior. Speci…cally, we use the opportunity of a quasi-natural experiment provided by China's value-added tax reform in 2004 to deal with the potential endogeneity of …xed investment. As the pilot reform in 2004 covered only three NE provinces of China, the incentive for …rm investment varied across both regions and years. We instrument …rm investment with these timing and cial dependence. Indeed, we …nd in Appendix Figure 1 that industries with higher external …nancial dependence have a larger share of SOEs (in terms of …rm number, employment, sales, and output). 18 Results using the number of …rms are similar (available on request). 19 To determine whether these results are consistent with the di¤erential results across SOEs and nonSOEs, we need to check whether the SOE share is higher in less competitive industries. Indeed, we …nd in Appendix Figure 2 that SOEs are more prevalent (in terms of …rm number, employment, sales, and output) in less competitive industries. regional variations generated by the reform to check the causal e¤ect of …xed investment. To deal with concerns about the potential endogeneity of the reform, we use the plausibly exogenous instruments framework developed by Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012). We also take into account simultaneous policy changes (e.g., the removal of the MFA at the beginning of 2005), which could contaminate the results in our estimation.
We …nd a consistently positive and signi…cant (statistically and economically) e¤ect of …rm investment on the probability of exporting. Speci…cally, the average exporting propensity of NE …rms increases by 2:39 percent because of the increase in investment after the reform, which is large relative to the average exporting propensity of 32:94 percent for the whole sample.
Following the recent trade literature, we further investigate underlying mechanisms through which …rm investment may a¤ect exporting probability. Speci…cally, we consider …rm productivity, market competition, and credit constraints, which are most relevant to our context. We …nd a signi…cant productivity enhancement e¤ect of …xed investment, which in turn promotes exporting. We also …nd that the e¤ect of …rm investment on exporting is larger in industries more dependent on external …nance and in more competitive industries, which implies the existence of credit constraints in …rm investment and of the power of …rms to pass the tax reduction e¤ects to consumers. Table 1 . Eligibility of manufacturing industries in the 2004 VAT pilot reform Eligible Industries (industry code in bracket) [13] agricultural and by-product 
